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Are the corporate governance standard in banks in the CEE countries low hanging 
fruit? 
 
Executive Summary and Keywords 
The dominance of foreign capital in banking sector in the CEE countries created 
vulnerabilities that have been a contributing cause of recent financial crisis in the region. The 
question is whether the corporate governance structure of banks seemed to constrain or rather 
stimulate the potential unfavourable scenario, in which the controlling investors would be 
improving their difficult financial situation at the cost of their subsidiaries during the financial 
crisis of 2008.   
The aim of the study is to evaluate corporate governance practices in banks that were 
listed on stock exchange during the financial crisis 2007-2009 in selected CEE countries: 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Those three economies managed to maintain relatively 
strong position of banking sector during the recent financial crisis in contrast to many 
Western and some Eastern countries.  
The quantitative and qualitative analysis focuses on structure and practice of 
supervisory board based on data gathered from survey sent to the banks, their financial 
statements, reports on corporate governance and supervisory boards’ report on their activities. 
The results of the research may be of interests not only to academics, but also to managers, in 
particular in banks, and regulators.  
The research confirms that banks in CEE continue being role models for non-financial 
companies in implementing good standards of corporate governance. The findings reveal that 
bank’s supervisory boards in the selected CEE countries during the financial crisis of 2008 
met the high standards of corporate governance with regard to the number of independent 
members, appointing independent member on the position of the chairman and chairman of 
audit committees. The study shows that during the crisis banks in the CEE countries 
themselves strived for improving corporate governance practices and they made some effort 
to implement post-crisis recommendations related to establishing risk and remuneration 
committees and appointing Chief Risk Officer. Banks listed in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary lag behind those listed in Poland with respect of frequency of audit committee 
meetings and supervisory board’s engagement in risk management. 
Increasing number of board committees with larger number of seats for independent 
board, provided that they do not have majority votes, can be implemented fairly quickly and 
relatively inexpensively. However the factual improvement of corporate governance of banks 
depends on professional qualities of the independent board members, their level of 
engagement in committee activities as well as their ability and willingness to challenge the 
existing contractual arrangements, in particular those that undermine the position of minority 
shareholders or other stakeholders such as depositors. It seems that implementing high 
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corporate governance standards with regard to board composition and its committees is just 
low hanging fruit and could not have significant impact on the potential unfavourable 
scenario, in which the controlling foreign investors would be improving their difficult 
financial situation at the cost of their subsidiaries based in Poland. Implementing regulation 
recommended by the international organization such as European Commission that are well 
suited for large widely held corporations will not improve corporate governance standards of 
banks in countries where their ownership structure is closely held.  
Keywords: corporate governance, regulation, banking, CEE. 
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1. Introduction 
Building sound corporate governance practices in the banking sector in Central and 
Eastern Europe since transition to a market economy commenced had two main motives. On 
one hand, it was essential for attracting private owners with capital and expertise. On the other 
hand, it was necessary for achieving and maintaining confidence of depositors in banking 
organization.  
The banking system in the Central and Eastern Europe countries was restored at the 
beginning of 90s. after being repressed by the socialist economic regime for almost five 
decades. The period of transition of banking system from monobank to two-tier structure was 
very much affected by restructuring process of banks, their privatization, increasing 
competition and lastly consolidation. All the proceedings ended up with creating healthy 
commercial banks that, in particular in Poland or in the Czech Republic, have stronger 
position during the recent financial crisis than their counterparts abroad both in Western and 
some Eastern countries. 
Prior to the wake of Lehman Brothers large inflows of foreign financing have indeed 
contributed to credit booms and foreign currency lending,  mostly done in euro or Swiss franc, 
in the CEE, especially in the Baltic states and Hungary. One of the key receiving sectors of 
the lending was real estate. For example, foreign currency loans as a share of total private 
sector lending reached nearly 80% in Estonia, whereas in the Czech Republic less than 15% 
(Kattel, 2010). Similarly to the Czech Republic, Poland also was able to avoid massive 
lending in foreign currency as started later than in other CEE countries.  
The relatively strong position of the Czech and Polish banking sector during the 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 is a consequence of a traditional business model. The funding 
model is based primarily on customers' deposits. Therefore, during the crisis of 2008 domestic 
banking sector characterized high levels of balance sheet liquidity. Additionally, financing of 
loan expansion mainly by primary deposits resulted in minimum dependence on funds from 
foreign markets, and only marginal use of loan securitisation.  
Banks in Poland and in the Czech Republic did not invest in risky derivatives and 
subprime-related assets that yielded high returns or granted mortgage credits to low income 
working individuals. Over the last decade they were improving proceedings related with 
enlarging deposits and granting well-collateralized credits under strict standards and loan 
provision criteria. The conservative business model was reinforced by foreign strategic 
investors. The owners – usually large financial groups – let their subsidiaries generate profit 
chiefly from dynamically expanding retail banking activities, while the management of 
securities and derivatives portfolios were usually concentrated in their branches in 
international financial centres. The belated, conservative banks’ policy, that was in addition 
supported by over-prudent behavior of the supervision authority, paradoxically protected 
Poland and the Czech Republic from a severe financial crisis in 2008. 
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Currently, banking sector in most of the CEE countries is well buffered, but risks 
remain. Most of banks are controlled by foreign strategic investors that are part of global 
financial groups mainly from the EU. Some of the blockholders have large portion of other 
than banking services at stake, which potentially increase operating risk. The difficult 
financial situation of parent companies has an impact on their subsidiaries operating in CEE. 
For example in Poland three out of ten largest banks were on sale because of financial 
troubles of the parent company. Despite very good financial standing there were difficulties to 
find a buyer for two of them, what make a pressure on systemic risk. The dominance of 
foreign ownership created vulnerabilities that have been a contributing cause of recent 
financial crisis in the region. It poses a question whether the practice of corporate governance 
of banks in CEE can add to or constrain the financial crisis in the CEE counties.  
The aim of the study is to evaluate corporate governance practices in the banking sector 
during 2007-2009 in countries of CEE with the significant size of banking sector: Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
two, preceded by introduction, explains the specificity of corporate governance of banks in 
CEE. In the third section an overview of banking regulation is provided. Fourth section 
outlines a methodological approach to the study. In the next section the findings related to 
composition and structure of bank’s supervisory board in the selected countries of CEE are 
discussed. In the last section conclusions are presented. 
2. Specificity of Corporate Governance of banks in CEE 
In the course of banks’ privatization, despite of using selected methods, there was a 
trend towards highly concentrated ownership structure. That is consistent with the view that 
effective corporate governance can be only established through blockholdings in case of 
poorly developed legal framework or capital market (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Blockholders possess appropriate incentives to effectively monitor managers, who are not 
capable of expropriating investors and maximizing their own utility instead of maximizing the 
return on shareholders’ investments. In CEE they also brought corporate governance expertise 
and tools to ensure meeting the obligation of accountability to them. Hence, the main conflict 
of interest lies between large investor and minority shareholders. The protection of minority 
shareholders from potentially expropriating controlling shareholder constitutes for the core 
corporate governance problem in the CEE countries.  
Banks operating in the CEE countries developed insider corporate governance system 
with highly concentrated ownership structure in foreign hands. Presence of large blockholders 
undermines external corporate governance mechanisms such as hostile takeovers and proxy 
fights. They are rather ineffective not only because of highly concentrated ownership 
structure, but also due to the fact that capital market is rather illiquid.  
Most of the foreign banks preferred to enter the CEE region using subsidiaries rather 
than branches (Hryckiewicz and Kowalewski, 2010). The tendency slightly changed  after the 
EU accession, when the number of foreign branches increases dramatically and eventually 
declines during the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the assets held by subsidiaries still 
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dominates the banking sector in emerging countries (see tab.1). The relatively small reliance 
of foreign banks on branches in the CEE is associated with unfavorable attitudes of host 
regulators toward this mode of entry (Cerutti et al., 2007) and their participation in acquisition 
of privatized local entities.  
Table 1. Subsidiaries vs foreign branches: number and its share in total assets 
Kraj Czech Hungary Poland 
 2001 2009 2001 2009 2001 2009 
Number of subsidiaries 20 21 26 23 46 42 
Number of branches 10 12 0 3 0 7 
CI’s assets to total assets 
in % for subsidiaries 
64.24 77.97 56.04 50.12 69.22 62.59 
CI’s assets to total assets 
in % for branches 
12.76 11.71 0 6.19 0 5.02 
Source: Allen, F., Gu, X., Kowalewski, O. (2011), “Corporate governance and intra-group transactions in 
European bank holding companies during the crisis”, mimeo. 
A strong presence of global financial groups is an integral part of the corporate 
governance model applied in banks in CEE that has very important consequences. On one 
hand, banks, being subsidiaries of foreign entities, are exposed to potential conflict of 
interests and asymmetric information that affect larger parties than in case of a parent 
company, namely blockholder, minority shareholders, bank managers, depositors, and 
borrowers (Dermine, 2006). The interests of depositors and borrowers should be safeguarded 
by the regulator. Due to the fact that the foreign subsidiaries are separate corporations that are 
fully subject to the host country’s jurisdiction, the agency problems may arise between the 
parent bank and local bank managers. Usually, the blockholder controls adequately bank 
managers by imposing on them functioning within organizational matrix, and hence has 
access to sufficient information on their actions. That may lead to mistreatment of minority 
investors, which is perceived as the most significant corporate governance conflict.  
Minority shareholders complain, in particular, about lack of equal treatment with regard 
to the access to financial information. Banks in CEE countries reveal quite often financial 
statements publicly after their parent companies. It means that a blockholder has privileged 
access to financial information. Theoretically, a parent company should get information about 
a subsidiary at the general meetings. In practice, information requested by a parent company 
is sent from certain department of subsidiaries to indicated unit of headquarters of a parent 
company, quite often without noticing the management board of the subsidiaries. The 
corporate governance problem is reinforced by lack of comprehensive regulation regarding 
capital groups.  
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On the other hand great portion of regulations binding for banks operating in the region 
is created abroad. Banks with the majority of foreign capital come under double regulations 
both domestic and from the country, where the parent company is located. Most of 
blockholders that are listed quite often on the largest stock exchanges in the world, enforced 
adoption of a very broad set of laws and regulation as well as very high corporate governance 
standards (Gandy et al. 2007, pp. 104). 
Banks in the CEE countries are not provided with any corporate governance code for 
deposit-taking institutions. Their practices in this field are shaped by law and internal 
regulation. Banks that are listed on stock exchange are required to implement the set of 
corporate governance rules called Corporate Governance Code. In Czech Republic, Corporate 
Governance Code based on the OECD Principles was introduced in 2001 (amended in 2004). 
Its compliance is voluntary and cannot be enforced. The structure of the document is based on 
the OECD Principles date as of 2004. It does not reflect specificity of the Czech corporate 
governance problems as well as recent recommendations withdrawn from the crisis. In 
Hungary (Corporate Governance Recommendations) and in Poland (Code of Best Practice for 
WSE Listed Companies) codes were in force in 2002 and later amended in 2007, 2008 and in 
2005, 2008, 2010 respectively. It is based on the “comply or explain” principle, which gives 
the market clear and unequivocal information about company’s compliance. The Hungarian 
and Polish codes, to a larger extent than the Czech, are adjusted to specific domestic 
conditions and were amended few times in order to better respond to external or internal 
challenges.  
3. Overview of banking regulation in CEE 
Banking laws and regulation in CEE are rather recent in comparison to the developed 
countries. Over the years of transition process banking law’s amendments were made in order 
to adjust with the EU legislation. Nowadays, it is completely aligned with the EU legislation. 
As far as the disclosure and transparency of financial markets are concerned both improved 
highly as a consequence of implementing the European regulation on Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID). It aims at better investor protection, promoting competition in 
financial sector as well as increasing market disclosure. 
At the beginning of 90s. the banking structure changed and monobank was replaced by 
a two-tier structure. A central bank and a number of commercial banks were established. In 
general, two approaches towards building banking sector in transition economies from the 
CEE region can be distinguished: entry of new private banks or rehabilitation of existing 
state-owned banks. In Czech, Hungary and Poland the latter prevailed. The banking reform 
encompassed recapitalization of existing banks along with an extensive program to develop 
them institutionally, mainly through restructuring followed by privatization.  
The number of banks was increasing primarily due to widespread foreign penetration. 
Global financial group become eager to buy stakes in the EEC countries as the regulatory 
environment strengthened. After finalizing the privatization of state-owned banks 
consolidation process occurred. Reduction in number of banks in the second decade of 
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transition process resulted mainly from strengthening bank’s market position or from the 
amalgamation of foreign banks subsidiaries and branches operating in the same country as 
well as from mergers and acquisitions on the EU markets (see table 2). At the end of 2009 in 
the Czech Republic there were 39 banks, whereas 87% of their assets were controlled by 
foreign investors, in Hungary and Poland 67 (61%) and 35 (70%) respectively.  In the Czech 
Republic and in Hungary the largest stake of banks’ assets were in hands of Austrian (25% 
and 15% respectively) and Belgian investors (20% and 10%, correspondingly). In Poland, at 
the end of 2009 there were 41 banks controlled by foreign investors with the largest share 
held by Italian, followed by German, Dutch and US. In contrast to the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, all 10 largest banks in Poland are listed on stock exchange. All of them possess a 
blockholder that exercises of voting rights from at least 60% of shares. More than half of 
listed banks shows that the stake in hands of controlling investor is not smaller than 70% of 
votes at the general meeting. The regulator usually allows to exercise their voting rights from 
no more than 75% of shares.  
As a consequence of consolidation process the level of concentration (measured by the 
share of the five largest banks in total banking sector assets – CR5) increased and as of the 
end of 2009 equaled slightly above 60% in the Czech Republic, 60% in Hungary and almost 
50% in Poland (Raiffeisen Research, 2010). The level of concentration of the Polish banking 
sector is slightly over the average EU level and one of the lowest among countries of CEE.   
 
Table 2. Selected features of banking sector in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland as of 2009.  
Country Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
The number of banks 39 35 67 
Banks’ assets controlled by foreign 
investors 
87.% 70% 61% 
Independent supervision authority over 
financial institutions 
No Yes Yes 
Deposit insurance system  Yes Yes Yes 
Savings limit/Coverage under deposit 
insurance system before the crisis 
25 000 EUR/ 90%  1-6 million 
HUF/90%  
up to 1000 
EUR/100% 
1000-22 500 EUR/ 
90%. 
Savings limit/Coverage under deposit 
insurance system  
50 000 EUR/100% 50 000 EUR/100% 50 000 EUR/100% 
Source: Own analysis based on data from Schich S., Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and Related Financial 
Safety Net Aspects, OECD, 2008 and CEE Banking Sector Report, Raiffeisen Research, 2010. 
The strong position of controlling blockholders, that concern themselves with the 
highest possible return on their equity, could threaten the interests of well recognized banks’ 
stakeholder – depositors. The latter cares about the rest of bank’s liabilities (debt). Therefore, 
solid banks’ supervision authority was highly required to monitor and constrain the 
management activities effectively controlled by blockholder. In order to protect the interests 
of depositors prudential regulation of banking activities and deposit insurance modeled on the 
European Union directives and recommendations worked out by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision were gradually introduced starting from early 90s. With this regard the 
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significant role was performed by the banking supervision authority that quickly caught up to 
the Western standards.  
The banking supervision authority, according to the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision as of 1997, is responsible for ensuring that foreign subsidiaries are well 
supervised within its borders. The crisis did not bring new solutions with this respect despite 
various suggestions (The de Larosière Group Report, 2009) aiming at strengthening the 
European system of financial supervision. The most recent proposal delivered by the 
European Commission (2010a) have not discussed the problem of corporate governance in 
foreign bank subsidiaries. 
The role of the banking supervision is not only protecting depositors by ensuring 
security of funds accumulated on bank accounts, but also assuring proper functioning of this 
market, its stability, security and transparency. With this regard regulator competes with the 
blockholder for control over a bank. The global financial groups are interested in maximizing 
the value of the whole group, which potentially, in particular during financial crisis, may be 
conflicting with measures adopted by other banks’ stakeholders – government and supervisors 
– towards greater stability of banking sector. Actions taken by supervision authority is mainly 
related to risk management and compliance of banking operations with provisions of the 
Banking Law, by-laws and the decision on the issue of license for the establishment of a bank.  
In the Czech Republic central bank serves as a supervisory authority of the financial 
market. The Czech National Bank oversees the banking sector, the capital market, the 
insurance industry, pension funds, credit unions, bureaux-de-change and payment system 
institutions. Hungarian and Polish banking supervision is a part of wider authority that 
perform its supervisory functions over financial institutions. It was required since global 
financial groups became very significant players in banking sector in those countries and they 
have highly contributed in spread in cross-sector financial products. 
In contrast to the Czech Republic, in Hungary and in Poland there is integrated 
independent authority that is responsible for the authorization and supervision of the financial 
institutions. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) was established in 2000 
as governmental body and in 2010 changed to a self-regulatory publicly financed body 
operated and managed independently. 
In Poland, from 1989 till 1997 banking supervision was a part of the central bank. In 
1997 supervision of banking activities was performed by an independent Commission for 
Banking Supervision (CBS). Decisions and tasks specified by the CBS were carried out and 
coordinated by its executive body - the General Inspectorate of Banking Supervision still 
located within the National Bank of Poland. In 2008 supervision of the financial market 
merged with financial supervision creating the Polish Financial Supervision Authority 
(PFSA). Responsibilities of the PFSA are wide-ranging including undertaking measures 
aimed at ensuring reliable operations of the financial markets in order to maintain its stability, 
safety and transparency. PFSA also deals with new issues such as: clients’ complaints, 
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financial education, preparing codes of best practice and monitoring compliance to it. All of 
them were of low or non importance before.   
Among the analyzed countries the supervision authority in Poland seemed to be the 
most extensive and prudent both before and during the crisis. Preceding the crisis a few pre-
emptive proceedings were taken regarding liquidity risk following Basell II and the CAD.  In 
2006 PFSA issued recommendation S related to the best practice in mortgage credit exposure 
that increased the cost of mortgage credit granted in foreign currency. In 2007, it passed the 
resolution regarding liquidity risk. All regulators’ activities contributed to the fact that banks 
in Poland are not concerned with liquidity crisis. Also, in the Czech Republic liquidity has not 
caused has any problems so far.  
During the crisis supervisory authority required collecting data of wider range. Banks 
became obliged to inform immediately about transactions in terms of decreasing of quick 
assets and internal limits against domestic or foreign institutions. Those actions concentrated 
on liquidity risk limitation and currency risk limitation. Furthermore, in Poland supervisory 
authority issued a recommendation encouraging banks to allocate total profit to bank’s equity, 
without paying dividends in order to boost own capital. It was not obligatory, however most 
banks in Poland implemented it.  
In all analyzed countries there is another entity, that in addition to the central bank and 
supervisory authority, is a part of the security net for deposits safety - deposit insurance fund, 
which performs two functions. First, in case of bank bankruptcy it repays deposits gathered by 
one individual up to guaranteed amount. Second, it provides banks threatened by bankruptcy 
with financial aids. All banks and branch offices of foreign banks are obliged to participate in 
the system and contribute to it. In Czech Republic, there is Deposit Insurance Fund that was 
established in 1994. Similar entity functions in Hungary - National Deposit Insurance Fund, 
established in 1993 and in Poland - Bank Guarantee Fund, established in 1994. According to 
the recent law amendments with regard to law adjustment to EU Directive 2009/14/EC the 
guarantee limits for deposit up to 50,000 euro are fully covered. The increase in compensation 
amount as well as shorter time for deposit insurance payments were necessary to boost 
depositors’ confidence in the banking system.  
4. Methodology 
This section presents a description of the research design, sample and data collection 
procedures. In order to generate credible data of appropriate range a mixed approach was 
used: a questionnaire survey and gathering certain information on supervisory board 
composition and structure from firms’ financial statements, their reports on corporate 
governance and supervisory boards’ reports on their activities.   
The sample of interest for the study is composed of all listed banks in the three selected 
countries of CEE: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. At the end of 2009 there were 
two banks listed on the Prague Stock Exchange, however one was cross-listed, two banks 
listed on Budapest Stock Exchange and finally 14 banks listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
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Due to very low free-float (less than 1% of all shares) and three banks were excluded from the 
survey as a problem of corporate governance is not relevant to them. Their combined share in 
capitalization of the banking sector on the Warsaw Stock Exchange was below 0.01%. 
Shortly, one of them was withdrawn from the stock exchange.  
The research questionnaire was sent to the listed banks from the three countries of CEE. 
It consisted of 23 open questions divided into three sections: composition and practices of 
supervisory board, composition and practices of supervisory board committees and policy’s 
disclosure, in particular with regard to executive compensation. There was additional section, 
comprising of 7 questions, that referred to the key challenges in the area of corporate 
governance of banks and anti-crisis measures related to corporate governance of banks 
undertaken during 2007-2009. The questionnaire was addresses to the president of the board 
and submitted to the board support departments in those banks where it existed otherwise to 
the investor relations departments. After several days the mail was followed up with an 
telephone request. 
We received responses from nine out of eleven banks listed on Polish stock exchange. 
Five banks answer all questions and four passed over questions about key challenges in the 
area of corporate governance of banks and anti-crisis measures related to corporate 
governance of banks undertaken during 2007-2009. 
5. Supervisory board composition and structure  
In three selected countries the two-tier corporate governance system prevails. There are 
two distinct entities: board of directors in Czech and in Hungary or management board in 
Poland and supervisory board. The latter is legally obliged to oversee constantly a company. 
Supervisory board members are appointed by a resolution of the general meeting. The 
management board is in charge of day to day company’s business, making strategic and 
operational decisions. Its members are appointed by the general meeting in Czech and 
Hungary and by the supervisory board in Poland.  
Table 3. Selected features of corporate governance system in Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.  
Country Czech Republic Hungary Poland 
Corporate 
governance 
system 
Compulsory two tier-system 
(board of directors and 
supervisory board) 
Optional*(board of directors 
and supervisory board or 
council of directors) 
Compulsory two tier-system 
(management board and 
supervisory board)** 
Corporate 
Governance Code 
Voluntary Comply or explain Comply or explain 
Board 
Independence 
Criteria described in CG 
Code, does not set minimum 
number of independent 
board members 
Criteria not described, 
referred to the EC  
recommendation as of 15 
February 2005, does not set 
minimum number of 
Criteria not described, 
referred to the EC  
recommendation as of 15 
February 2005, at least two 
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independent board members independent board member  
Audit Committee mandatory for public- 
interest entities 
mandatory for public- 
interest entities 
mandatory for public- 
interest entities 
Compensation 
Committee 
Recommended by the CG 
Code with majority 
participation of independent 
board members 
Set up by the general 
meeting and consists of 
members of the Managing 
Body, the Supervisory 
Board and the executive 
management, although the 
majority should be 
independent board 
members. 
Not directly recommended 
Gender Diversity  Not mentioned Not mentioned CG code recommends 
balanced proportion of 
women and men in 
management and 
supervisory board.  
(*) Option to choose one-tier/two-tier system. 
(**)The European company, that is very rare, may choose between one-tier/two-tier systems. 
Source: Own based on data from EBRD, Corporate Governance Codes. 
 
Strengthening of the oversight role of supervisory board is a high priority of corporate 
governance in CEE. The corporate governance codes make a pressure on its members to meet 
the following requirements: independent, highly competent and ability to make self-
assessment in order to increase the minority shareholder rights’ protection. Independent board 
members tend to be seen as neutral in company evaluation, more inclined toward overseeing 
management board in the interests of the company not in the interests of a certain investor, 
capable to take impartial position during board discussions and more apt to improve 
supervisory board’s proceedings.  
The analysis shows that the average size of supervisory board was almost 9 members 
(see table 4) . It largely goes beyond local standards for Poland as the average size of listed 
companies is 4-5 members (Deloitte&Touche, 2007). 44% of supervisory board members 
held degree in economics, 17% in law, 7,5% in engineering, 16% graduated from other 
studies and in case of the rest of 16% the education details were not available. Only 8% of 
supervisory board members were women. 7 out of 14 banks had women board participation. 
In case of 6 banks it was just one board member. Only one woman held function of 
chairwoman.  
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Table 4.  Selected characteristics of banks and their supervisory boards. 
 
 
Almost all banks listed in Poland exceeded the criteria set in the corporate governance 
code as they had more than two independent board members (see tab. 4). Only one bank 
informed that it did not comply to the rule by having none independent board member. 6 out 
of 11 listed banks notified that at least half of the board consisted of independent board 
members. In Hungary and in the Czech Republic the corporate governance codes do not 
specify the number of independent board members. It should enable to make independent 
judgments. In Hungarian banks at least one third of supervisory board members were 
independent. The Czech bank lagged behind given that 20% of mandates were held by 
independent board members. On average, there were four independent board members, 
although the median value was slightly higher five. Most of the independent board members 
did not have industry experience. 12 out of 14 banks reported that the chairman of supervisory 
board was independent. In both countries there was employee representatives’ participation in 
the supervisory board. Furthermore, none of the banks used fit-and-proper director test to 
investigate whether the person with board mandate has necessary competences, skills, 
experience as well as ethical attitude to fulfil tasks assigned to them.  
Supervisory board gatherings were organized at least once per quarter. The average 
number of sessions reached 7 in 2007, 6.5 and 7 for 2008 and 2009 respectively (median for 
2007, 2008 and 2009 equalled 7.5). Only 2 Polish banks pointed out that the supervisory 
board met nine times every year during 2007-2009, which is very close to the average number 
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of meetings for a European company (9,6) annually (Heidrick&Struggles, 2009). Any trend of 
increasing number of supervisory board meetings was not observed during financial crisis 
2008-2009. They were organized the most frequently in banks with the significant stake 
controlled by the state. It may be  an evidence that those supervisory boards had stronger 
position. It was striking that the average gathering length in the Czech Republic was 1,5 hour. 
In Poland, 73% of listed companies indicated that the supervisory board meetings lasted on 
average 2-4 hours (Deloitte&Touche, 2007).  
Enhancing supervisory board’s position can be achieved through the operation of its 
committees. The Czech corporate governance code specifies that company should establish 
audit, remuneration and nomination committees. The Hungarian and Polish codes leave more 
flexibility. The former promotes audit, remuneration and nomination committees, but 
indicates that supervisory board can ensure the execution of previously specified tasks 
through other committees. The Polish code does not limit the type and number of supervisory 
board committees.  
Almost all banks (except from one) reported about an audit committee. In all three 
countries according to the EU Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual accounts 
and consolidated accounts, all public interest companies should established audit committee 
with supervisory board. There should be at least three members, among whom there should be 
one that meets independence criteria and has competence in accounting and/or auditing. 
However, in Poland a company may try to evade the obligation. In companies, where 
supervisory board consists of minimum number of members required by law (five), the tasks 
of the audit committee may be performed by the whole supervisory board. This solutions is 
heavily used by non financial companies. 
An average size of the audit committee consisted of almost four members (median 
slightly lower 3.5), among whom two possessed status of independent board member (see 
table 5). In 12 out of 14 banks at least one third of the audit committee was formed by 
independent board members. 9 banks informed that the chairman of the committee was 
independent board member, but only in three cases he was qualified in accounting or auditing. 
Except from chairman no other independent audit committee member had competence in 
accounting or auditing. In consequences, 9 banks had no audit committee member with  
significant financial expertise proven by title of certified accountant.  
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Table 5. Selected characteristics of supervisory board committees. 
 
 
11 out of 14 banks, 10 Polish and 1 Hungarian, established an audit committee before 
2008, when it was not legally binding, but aligned with the Corporate Governance Code. Most 
of the audit committees in Poland organized meetings on quarterly basis that is rather rare in 
comparison to an average European company that had audit committee meetings once per 
month on average (Heidrick&Struggles, 2009). The average number of audit committee 
meetings for Polish listed banks were four in 2007 whereas in 2008-2009 increased to five. 2 
out of 11 banks reported on audit committee’s gathering every second month. The Hungarian 
and the Czech banks organized the meetings less than once a quarter. In addition, they 
established the audit committee in 2009, when it was legally binding.  
The main areas of audit committee activities are financial reporting and risk control. 
With regard to the latter the survey asked how the audit committee ensured effectiveness and 
independence of internal audit function. Only 4 banks indicated in the questionnaire that 
supervisory board, based on audit committee’s opinion, accepted changes on the position of 
the head of internal audit department and other personal changes in the bank’s unit, including 
decisions on the size of the employees’ compensation and training programs. 7 banks 
answered that the head of internal audit department reported to the CEO and simultaneously 
to audit committee of the supervisory board.  
The number of the supervisory board committees in banks was the highest in Poland. In 
fact, in Hungarian and Czech banks there were only two committees: audit and remuneration. 
In most of the banks remuneration committee was established after the crisis appeared in 
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2008. 7 out of 14 banks reported that at least one independent board member sat on the 
remuneration committee and 5 out of 7 informed that at least half of the committee was 
independent.  The post crisis recommendations stressed its role in creating and implementing 
the general principle of compensation policy for executive board members (OECD, 2009). 
Just one bank can be considered as having the independent board member with relevant 
expertise and experience. The Czech and Hungarian banks did not provided information on 
the composition of the remuneration committee.  
Only one bank disclose the compensation policy along with measures impacting the 
variable elements of the remuneration. In the questionnaire 2 other banks listed financial 
indicators, such as: revenue, ROAC, deposit or credit market share as well as the cost to 
revenue ratio, that determined the size of the executives’ bonuses. The survey results show 
that very few banks in the CEE countries decided to change the executive remuneration 
during the crisis. 2 banks pointed out that bonuses for 2008 were not paid out or significantly 
decreased in order to avoid redundancies (malus). The supervisory board of third bank 
adopted resolutions on adjusting revenue by deducting all ad hoc transitions, which decreased 
the basis for bonus repayment.  
Almost all banks disclosed executive remuneration of individual executives and non-
executive board members. According to recent EU Commission post-crisis recommendations 
(2009/385/EC) and Directive 2010/76/EU – CRD III company should change the rules of 
determining variable elements of remuneration for members of the management board and 
disclose the policy, which will be costly regulatory initiative designed for large transnational 
corporations. Poland is the most advanced in terms of disclosure of remuneration of the 
management and supervisory board members. Since 2005, according to the Ministry of 
Finance’s Directives on current and periodical information, listed companies must show all 
elements of remuneration paid out, due or potentially due, individually for all members of 
both corporate bodies. As far as the disclosure of the detailed remuneration policy is 
concerned the requirement is met by just one bank. In general, disclosure on corporate 
governance policies and practices in Poland and in Hungary is quite often dependent on the 
size of a bank. The larger bank, the more information is accessible. However, this relation is 
not observed in the Czech Republic, where listed banks do not have dedicated corporate 
governance section on their web pages. 
The survey results reveal that most of the banks did not have risk committee. 3 banks 
notified about it and 2 out of 3 established risk committee as a post-crisis recommendation. 7 
Polish banks indicated that Chief Risk Officer was appointed recently after the crisis appeared 
and he or she reported directly to the supervisory board or to its risk committee. 5 banks 
notified that there is one executive board member responsible for risk management who 
reported directly to the CEO. The executive is in charge of preparing all materials on risk 
management policy and proceedings for supervisory board meetings. Those banks stressed 
that reporting took place on quarterly basis, 2 other banks informed that they share the 
information more often at every supervisory board gathering.  
16 
 
Based on bank’s individual needs banks in Poland established other types of 
supervisory board committees, among others strategy, investment, finance and IT 
modernization.  
6. Conclusions 
The research confirms that banks in CEE continue being role models for non-financial 
companies in implementing good standards of corporate governance. One hand to, this is due 
to the fact that most banks are foreign subsidiaries of large multinational financial groups that 
enforced adoption of a very broad set of laws and regulation exceeding local standards. On 
the other hand, dominance of foreign ownership in banking sector in the CEE countries 
induces regulator to act in very prudent way in order to protect the interests of depositors and 
maintain stability of financial system. The adjustment to the strict regulation is quite costly for 
banks operating locally. 
 
The findings reveal that bank’s supervisory boards in the selected CEE countries during 
the financial crisis of 2008 met the high standards of corporate governance with regard to the 
number of independent members, appointing independent member on the position of the 
chairman and chairman of audit committees. The study shows that during the crisis banks in 
the CEE countries themselves strived for improving corporate governance practices and they 
made some effort to implement post-crisis recommendations related to establishing risk and 
remuneration committees and appointing Chief Risk Officer. Banks listed in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary lag behind those listed in Poland with respect of frequency of audit 
committee meetings and supervisory board’s engagement in risk management. 
Increasing number of board committees with larger number of seats for independent 
board, provided that they do not have majority votes, can be implemented fairly quickly and 
relatively inexpensively. However the factual improvement of corporate governance of banks 
depends on professional qualities of the independent board members, their level of 
engagement in committee activities as well as their ability and willingness to challenge the 
existing contractual arrangements, in particular those that undermine the position of minority 
shareholders or other stakeholders such as depositors. It seems that implementing high 
corporate governance standards with regard to board composition and its committees is just 
low hanging fruit and could not have significant impact on the potential unfavourable 
scenario, in which the controlling foreign investors would be improving their difficult 
financial situation at the cost of their subsidiaries based in Poland. Implementing regulation 
recommended by the international organization such as European Commission that are well 
suited for large widely held corporations will not improve corporate governance standards of 
banks in countries where their ownership structure is closely held.  
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